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The contents of this volume comprise
the proceedings of the Sixth Annual New
York University Institute of Philosophy.
Among the thirty-three participants were
such figures as John Courtney Murray,
S.J., Jerome Hall, Wolfgang Friedman,
and H.S. Rommen. The Institute directed
its attention to three major topics: Law
and Ethics (with emphasis on the question of civil disobedience); Natural Law;
and Judicial Reasoning. Papers were delivered by three individuals on each of
the foregoing topics, followed by several
commentaries of shorter duration. Unfortunately, some of the commentaries are so
cryptic that the reader finds himself shifting gears every few pages in an attempt to
grasp the point of view of each new commentator.
The major paper on the subject of civil
disobedience was delivered by Professor
John Rawls of Harvard University. In it
he formulated the proposition that "an unjust institution or law cannot be justified
by an appeal to a greater new sum of advantages, and that the duty of fair play
cannot be analogously overridden. An unjust institution or law or the overriding
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of the duty of fair play can be justified only
by a greater balance of justice." Father
Murray, among others, took issue with
Professor Rawls' formulation of both the
issue and the answer with respect to civil
disobedience, expressing the view that they
are really subsumed under the larger question of why man is obliged to obey law
in general. Professor Konvitz puts forth a
novel theory which implies that punishment of the party participating in civil
disobedience may be anticipated, and indeed necessary, to bring home to the public that travesty of justice against which
the disobedience is aimed. The consensus
was that civil disobedience may be justified in particular cases; however, there was
little unanimity on the basis for this conclusion.
The second part of this volume consists
largely of comments upon Professor Rommen's paper entitled "In Defense of Natural Law." The materials found in this
part are significant for two reasons. Viewed
in one light, they reveal a cross-section of
current American thought on the nature
and content of law, as expounded by philosophy professors at some of the nation's
most influential universities. Surprisingly
little is entirely new, the views expressed
reflecting the influence of legal theories put
forth by Western philosophers over the
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past several centuries. In a negative fashion, the symposium is enlightening because
it brings home the fact that broad based
acceptance of natural law 'by American
thinkers is not close at hand. Running
throughout the commentaries upon Professor Rommen's paper is the viewpoint that
natural law represents either a closed legal
system or a lowest common denominator
among legal philosophies which hold forth
man's "fulfillment" as the end of law. Professor Friedman, for example, posits that
while man seeks enduring standards and
certainty in lawmaking, nevertheless, even
the Nuremberg judgments may be supported on a purely positivistic basis.
The final section of the work, devoted to
Judicial Reasoning, contains contributions
from such scholars as Professors Freund,
Levi, Wechsler, and Henkin. This material

continues
the nationwide
discussion
touched off by Professor Wechsler's theory
of "neutral principles." Interesting questions are raised concerning possible conflict between Professor Wechsler's formulation and the Supreme Court's self-imposed limitation of deciding only the case
before it. Professor Levi contributes valuable insights on an important aspect of
stare decisis: is it more imperative when
the earlier decision interprets a statute
rather than a principle of common law.
This book is certainly not to ,be classed
as light reading. It is too eclectic to be of
real assistance to a student beginning his
inquiry into jurisprudence. It should, however, prove a valuable source for scholars
desiring to obtain a cross-section of current views on the subjects of natural law,
civil disobedience, and the judicial process.

RACE RELATIONS

commitment. If we overlook this gracious
aspect of the sacrament of marriage or
even minimize it, we are in danger of reducing the sacrament to a purely natural
state influenced only by economic, social,
or psychological pressures and motives.
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that we are talking of a sacrament capable
of producing, during the entire existence of
the marriage, those graces which will enable the couple to fulfill their Christian
DECISIONS
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'
not ration justice." 18
Is not justice rationed
in favor of the wealthy defendant when he
is represented by proficient and experienced counsel, as against the indigent who
is forced by decisions such as that in
Peters to prepare and present his own appeal to the Supreme Court? Since the
Supreme Court has ordered counsel to be
appointed for indigents at criminal trials,
Is Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not
Meet The Constitutional Mandate, 49 A.B.A.J.
435 (1963).

the holding of Peters seems inconsistent
with the philosophy inherent in prior case
law. By virtue of the instant case, the indigent's guarantee of representation will
be terminated not in a lower court, but
rather at the doorstep of the court from
which that guarantee emanates. It becomes
evident that only with respect to appeals
to the Supreme Court will the discrimination between rich and poor, arising from
a denial of appointed counsel, survive.
This, in the very court which so emphatically condemned any discriminatory
practice based on wealth!

